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The Impact of Ownership on Companies’ Investment Rates Modelled Using Present 
and Past Values of Profitability 
 
Abstract 
We empirically analyze the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment 
rates in Ukraine allowing investment rates to depend on present and past market-to-book 
values of equity. We relate the impact to the presence of soft and hard budget constraints, to 
the free cash flow and the cash constraint hypothesis and discuss over- and under-investment. 
Several robustness checks, in particular, the potential endogeneity of ownership variables are 
considered. 
Keywords: Investment, Ownership, Corporate Governance, Investment, Financial 
Constraints, Soft Budget Constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
Analyzing the determinants of the performance of firms including firms’ investment has been 
an important topic in the economic literature for decades. In the context of economies that are 
in transition from economic structures monopolized by the state to Western-style market 
economies (Megginson and Netter (2001)), the analysis of the determinants of the growth of 
fixed assets of firms is even more important for smoothing this transition. The Central and 
Eastern European economies witnessed large privatization efforts to move the economies 
away from state ownership and closer to market economies, initially transitioning into 
structures of varying forms of insider ownership (see Roland (2000)). One important 
underlying notion of these processes has been that ownership impacts on firms’ performance 
and investment. Recent research in corporate finance and governance provides evidence that 
agency and informational issues render the ownership structure of the firm relevant for the 
performance of firms (for example, Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001)). 
Recent studies on companies’ investment rates in Eastern European economies (for 
example, Lizal and Svejnar (2002), Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), Mykhayliv and Zauner 
(2013)) provide evidence for the explanatory power of different ownership groups and 
corporate governance variables. The main reasons for the relevance of the ownership 
structure for investment seem to be the role of soft and hard budget constraints and the 
varying degree of the magnitude of private benefits of control (Mykhayliv and Zauner 
((2013), (2015)) of the different ownership groups. 
Here, in contrast to the literature, we analyze investment rates using a dynamic Tobin’s 
Q model where companies’ investment rates are allowed to depend on the present and past 
market-to-book value of equity, the proxy for Tobin’s Q. The interpretation for this is that 
companies’ managers may base their investment decisions not just on expected future growth 
rates or profitability, but also on historical values thereof. 
 We allow for this more general investment model as it is typically the case, in 
particular, in Central and Eastern European transitional economies, that the market-to-book 
value has no explanatory power in investment regressions. 
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In the context of companies in transitional economies, the relationship between state 
ownership and companies’ performance is of particular interest (Megginson and Netter 
(2001)). An important factor in explaining companies’ investment rates of state owned 
companies is the concept of soft budget constraints (Kornai (1979), Kornai (1980), Kornai, 
Maskin and Roland (2003)), that is, activities that allow companies to neglect financial 
discipline. Even though there is ample evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints, 
the empirical link between companies’ performance (Djankov and Murrell (2002),  Estrin and 
Rosevear (1999, 1999a), Grygorenko and Lutz (2007)) or investment (Lizal and Svejnar 
(2002) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)) and state ownership is surprisingly weak in Central 
and  Eastern European countries. An important hypothesis is therefore whether the state 
ownership is negatively related to companies’ investment rates. 
There are two more important factors that weigh on investment rates and the 
performance of companies in transition countries. The second factor is related to actions that 
reduce the value of the company in order to improve the private welfare of some individuals 
or groups who are able to exert control over the company against the welfare of shareholders. 
These actions are commonly labelled tunnelling ((Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes and 
Shleifer (2000)), asset stripping (Campos and Giovannoni (2006), Ochoa et al. (2015)) or, in 
a less pronounced form, private benefits of control ((Grossman and Hart (1988), Mykhayliv 
and Zauner (2013)). 
The third factor is related to financial imperfections in the form of hard budget 
constraints or financial constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), see also Barran 
and Peeters (1998), Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Wet (2004)). Under perfect capital markets 
with no taxes and the assumption that the individual investor faces the same borrowing rate 
as firms, the capital structure of a company is irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller (1958)) and it 
does not matter whether internal or external funds are used to finance investment. However, 
as it is well known that external funds are typically more costly than internal funds due 
agency and informational issues.   
Given these three and other factors, ownership plays an important role in the 
performance  and investment behaviour of companies, particularly where ownership and 
control functions are separated (Fama and Jensen (1983), Belkhir et al. (2014)). This paper 
tries to analyze the impact of different ownership groups (state, insider or management, non-
domestic, finance, and financial and industrial groups (FIG)) on investment rates. We also 
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investigate the impact of the existence of a significant minority with the ability to block 
major decisions within the company on investment rates. We also try to gauge the effect of 
the three different factors detailed above in explaining investment rates. 
The question also arises whether firm’s investment is at an optimum level or whether 
there is too much or too little investment (over-investment or under-investment) that erodes 
shareholder value. The firm’s ownership structure via the indicated factors plays an important 
role in determining over- and under-investment. 
There are two theories that to a large degree explain companies’ investment rates, the 
cash constraint and the management discretion theory (Hadlock (1998)) or the free cash flow 
theory of Jensen (1986). The cash constraints theory relates investment rates to hard budget 
constraints whereas the manager discretion theory relates them to the abusive use of funds by 
the management to build empires and to increase their private welfare to the detriment of the 
value of the company or to soft budget constraints. These two theories are also relevant for 
the issue of over- versus under-investment. 
There are several studies analyzing the impact of ownership structures on companies’ 
investment in Central and Eastern European transition countries: Lizal and Svejnar (2002) 
(Czech Republic),  Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) (Hungary),  Mickiewicz, Bishop and 
Varblane (2004) (Estonia), Colombo and Stanca (2006) (Hungary). Typically (except Perotti 
and Vesnaver (2004)), the market-to-book value of equity is not used in these investment 
regressions. The results typically show evidence for soft budget constraints and financial 
imperfections and the cash constraint theory. Typically, state ownership has a negligible 
impact on companies’ investment rates. Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) use the change in the 
market-to-book value of equity and emphasize the role of private benefits of control to 
provide evidence for a significantly negative impact of state ownership on investment. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the models. Section 
3 provides the estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Companies’ Investment Rates and Ownership Groups 
 
In this paper, we use the data set in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) with 134 listed, large 
Ukrainian companies and 590 observations over the years 2002 to 2007. The companies in 
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the data set come from different sectors of the Ukrainian economy, in particular, electricity 
and energy (21.54%), engineering (11.96%), mining (11.96%), metals (6.72%), steel 
(6.72%),  chemicals (6.72%), and others. More details on the data set can be found in 
Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013).  Summary statistics are contained in Table I. The data set is 
derived from Dragon Capital (2006, 2007)), the First Securities Trading System PFTS 
(http://www.pfts.com.ua/ukr/) and the Agency for the Development of Infrastructure for 
Funds Market in Ukraine (www.smida.gov.uk).  The ownership data were checked using the 
Ukrainian business press and relate to 2005 and 2006 and display a very limited time 
variability. Summary statistics of the ownership group shares are given in Table II. 
Table I: Summary of Financials in US$. 
Note. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of financials in thousands of US$. MBV is the market-
to-book value of equity. Source: Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) 
Table II: Ownership Group Shares 
Variable Mean (%) Std. Dev. Min (%) Max(%) 
State 14.74 0.2784 0 96.8 
Insider 12.57 0.2841 0 96 
NonDomestic 18.21 0.3203 0 98.3 
Finance 16.94 0.312 0 100 
FIG 35.88 0.4064 0 100 
Note. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the ownership group shares. FIG stands for 
financial and industrial groups. Source: Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) 
Mykhayliv and Zauner (2010, 2013) introduce private benefits of control into a 
marginal Tobin’s Q investment model. The private benefits of control are modeled as shares 
Financials Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Total Assets 358938.7 643963.5 8558 74199651 
Fixed Assets 162428.8 264431 433 2052003 
Investment 35233.5 82375.06 -114297 803287 
MBV 2.368675 6.148593 0 99.56863 
Net Income 22927.35 65477.76 -162091 580383 
Depreciation 12509.5 37864.57 -2628 756780 
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of cash flow that can be diverted out of the company at the expense of passive shareholders.  
This implies that investment is impacted by marginal Q, a measure of the profitability of 
investment, hard and soft budget constraints, shares of ownership groups potentially enjoying 
private benefits of control and control variables.  
In contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), we empirically investigate a Tobin’s Q 
model with persistence in the market-to-book value of equity in the sense that the investment 
rates are allowed to depend on current and past market-to-book value. We hypothesize that 
investment decisions are based on present and historical values of the profitability of 
investment. This generalization is necessary since typically in this literature the present 
market-to-book value does not have explanatory power for investment..  
We follow the literature and use a positive cash flow coefficient as evidence for hard 
budget constraints and an insignificant or negative cash flow coefficient as evidence for soft 
budget constraints (Mickiewicz, Bishop and Varblane (2004), Lizal and Svejnar (2002)). As 
in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) we use ownership shares and indicators of different 
categories of firms to measure the ownership shares of controllers enjoying private benefits.  
Since private benefits of control have to be financed, cash flow may also reflect the 
constraints from financing private benefits. Hence, the estimate for the ownership shares may 
indicate the impact of private benefits of control not already captured by cash flow and 
presents a low estimate for the impact of private benefits of control on investment. 
 
3. Dynamic Q model and Results 
 
First, in contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), we investigate a reduced form regression 
motivated by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) with 
only the present value of the market-to-book value. We focus on a model where the 
dependent variable is the investment rate (investment to fixed assets ratio), the explanatory 
variables are the present market-to-book value of equity and ownership group shares. Control 
variables are the cash flow to fixed assets ratio, the total assets to fixed assets ratio, the 
leverage to fixed assets ratio and the log of total assets. In this regression, the market-to-book 
value of equity is a proxy for the investment’s profitability. Cash flow is a proxy for liquidity, 
soft or hard budget constraints. The ratio of total to fixed assets is a proxy the tangibility of 
assets and the log of total assets is a proxy for size. The regression includes the following set 
of ownership groups: state ownership (state), insider or management ownership (insider), 
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non-domestic ownership (non-domestic), ownership by banks and other financial companies 
(finance) and ownership by financial and industrial groups and holdings (FIG). We also 
investigate a corporate governance variable, minority, that is, majority ownership with a 
blocking minority, which relates to the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection. 
We look at two versions of the model, by focussing on a specification where the 
ownership is measured in shares and where the ownership is measured by an indicator 
variable with a 50% cut-off value. 
The two regressions are given by 
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where i relates to firm i, t  relates to year; itI  is new investment, the difference between fixed 
assets at the end and the beginning of year t taking depreciation into account, itA is fixed 
assets at the beginning of year t; itMBV  is the market-to-book value of equity at the 
beginning of period t; itCF is cash flow in year t; itAssets  are total assets at the beginning of 
year t, itL  is leverage (total debt) at the beginning of year t; log is the natural logarithm;
j
its is 
ownership of group j  ( FIGfinancedomesticnoninsiderstatej ,,,,  )  where the ownership 
is either measured in shares or as an indicator  with value 1 if there is a majority ownership of 
the respective ownership group; orityitd
min  is indicator for  minority; td  are time indicators, t is 
a time trend, iv is a firm specific error term; and it  is the usual ordinary least squares error 
term. 
Table III presents the results of a random effects regression of ownership in shares. We 
employ a random effects regression in order to estimate the coefficients of the ownership 
variables that have a very limited time dependency. The Hausman tests check the 
appropriateness of a random versus a fixed effects specification. 
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Table III: Investment Rates and Ownership Shares: Present Market-to-Book Value 
 
 Shares Indicator 
Market-to-
book value  
.0021 
(.0091) 
.0021 
(.0091) 
Cash Flow  .7395
***
 
(.0185) 
.7387
*** 
(.0184) 
Total Assets -.3279
*** 
(.0111) 
-.3287
*** 
(.0110) 
Leverage .3491
*** 
(.0150) 
.3506
*** 
(.0149) 
Log Total 
Assets 
.2226
*** 
(.0787) 
.2308
*** 
(.0785) 
State -1.0470
*** 
(.3933) 
-.8541
*** 
(.2904) 
Insider .09573  
(.36042) 
.0295 
(.273) 
Non-domestic .5341
* 
(.2756) 
.4888
** 
(.2222) 
Finance .8788
*** 
(.2822) 
.7547
*** 
(.2385) 
FIG -.8101
*** 
(.2519) 
-.8792
*** 
(.2048) 
Significant 
Minority 
1.0647
*** 
(.2945) 
1.0566
***
 
(.2959) 
Constant 15.0278 
(85.63647) 
20.9138 
(84.9994) 
Wald χ2 1625.92  
(.0000) 
1667.94 
(0.0000) 
Breusch and 
Pagan 
28.01  
(.0000) 
32.43 
(0.0000) 
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Hausman 
(efficient) 
354.23  
(.0000) 
350.50 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 overall 0.6203 0.6194 
Note. Random Effects Estimation.  Standard errors below the coefficient in brackets. The 10 (5) [1] % level is 
shown as * (**) and [***]. Wald, Breusch and Pagan, and Hausman test statistics (p-values in brackets) uses the 
estimated co-variance matrix of the efficient estimator. 
 
The results show that the market-to-book value of equity is not significant in these 
regressions, as in Perotti and Vesnaver (2004). The estimate for cash flow variable is positive 
and highly significant, consistent with the presence of financial constraints. Larger firms have 
a higher investment rate. In contrast with Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), leverage is positively 
related to investment and highly significant. In contrast with Lizal and Svejnar (2002) and 
Perotti and Vesnaver (2002), state ownership has a negative impact on investment. 
Ownership by financial and non-domestic firms has a positive effect on investment rates. 
Ownership by financial and industrial groups exerts a negative influence on investment.  
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the existence of a significant minority 
has a positive effect on investment.  A possible explanation is that a significant minority 
exerts a disciplining factor on the insider and private benefits of controllers and improves 
corporate governance structures.  
We apply further robustness checks on the models in Table III. Ordinary least squares 
while controlling for industry fixed effects (19 different industries) produces quantitatively 
similar results, even though the state ownership variable becomes insignificant. Similarly, a 
firm random effects specification and, at the same time, controlling for industry-fixed effects 
again produces similar results with state ownership rendered insignificant. As expected, due 
to the very limited time variability of the ownership data, a firm fixed effects specification 
with industry fixed effects renders all ownership variables insignificant but confirms the sign 
and magnitude of all other regressors. 
As another robustness check, we also investigate the potential endogeneity of 
ownership variables. We follow the approach in Lins (2003) (see also Lemmon and Lins 
(2003)) adapted to investment regressions. The limited time-dependency of the ownership 
data is an issue to be aware of. Recall that there are only two dates where we observe 
ownership and that for a large proportion of the data set the ownership data on the two dates 
are the same. This leads to a simple specification similar to the large literature where 
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endogeneity is modelled in a cross-sectional framework (for example, Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001)).  To avoid identification issues, we investigate the potential endogeneity 
for one ownership variable at a time. Motivated by Lins (2003), the investment equation 
mirrors the previous model except that size (the log of total assets) is not included. The first 
stage (or ownership) equations have the ownership variable of interest as the dependent 
variable, the investment rate as the simultaneously determined variable and controls; and the 
log of total assets, the producer price index and sales growth as instrumental variables. The 
identification of the instrumental variables requires that these variables plausibly only 
influence investment or ownership, but not both.  
We report the results on state ownership as all the other results appear to provide 
support of model in Table III (with the market-to-book value remaining insignificant) and the 
exogeneity of the ownership variables. The results of the instrumental variables regressions 
for the state ownership variable are displayed in Table IV. 
 
Table IV: Two Stage Least Squares Random Effects Panel Data Estimation: State Ownership 
 
 Shares First Stage Indicator First Stage 
Dependent 
Variable 
Investment 
State 
Ownership 
Investment 
State 
Ownership 
MBV .0205  
(.0143) 
.0044
***
  
(.0015) 
.0226 
(.01462) 
.0064
***
  
(.0020) 
Cash Flow  .6527
***
 
(.0279) 
 .0142
***
 
(.0051) 
 .6473
***
 
(.0282) 
 .0182
***
 
(.0069) 
Total Assets -.2639
*** 
(.0168) 
-.0085
*** 
(.0024) 
-.2627
*** 
(.0169) 
-.0111
*** 
(.0032) 
Leverage .2770
*** 
(.0238) 
.0105
*** 
(.0029) 
.2766
*** 
(.0238) 
.0138
*** 
(.0039) 
State -6.2614
*** 
(1.2884) 
--
 
 
-4.7810
*** 
(.9482) 
--
 
 
Insider -2.4234
***
  
(.6460) 
-.4279
*** 
(.0361) 
-1.7411
*** 
(.4582) 
-.3880
***
 
(.0383) 
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Non-domestic -.6542
* 
(.3488) 
-.1546
*** 
(.0297) 
-.5660
* 
(.2943) 
-.1818
*** 
(.0328) 
Finance -.1182 
(.3299) 
-.1267
*** 
(.0314) 
-.1582
 
(.2789) 
-.1400
*** 
(.0357) 
FIG -2.178
*** 
(.4481) 
-.3223
*** 
(.0247) 
-1.9268
*** 
(.3673) 
-.3545
*** 
(.0276) 
Significant 
Minority 
1.3117
*** 
(.3432) 
.13588
***
 
(.0334) 
1.6804
*** 
(.3860) 
.2597
***
 
(.0449) 
Investment -- -.01450
**
 
(.0063) 
-- -.02139
**
 
(.0085) 
Log Assets -- .0539
***
 
(.0082) 
-- .0738
***
 
(.0109) 
Producer 
Price Index 
--  
 
.0517 
(.0740) 
--  
 
. 122943 
(.0995) 
Sales Growth -- 
 
-.0071 
(.0051) 
-- 
 
-.0081 
(.0069) 
R
2
 overall 0.4368  0.4313  
Note. Two Stage Least Squares Random Effects Panel Data Estimation.  Standard errors are given in brackets 
below the estimated coefficient. The 10 (5) [1] % level is shown as * (**) and [***]. 
 
The results show that, looking at the investment regression, controlling for 
simultaneity, the investment rate is still negatively impacted by state ownership, albeit at a 
very large magnitude. This is true both for the shares and indicator ownership specification. 
The ownership equation or first stage regression shows that state ownership is negatively 
impacted by investment. A possible interpretation of this result is that there is some evidence 
in this specification that state ownership is negatively related to investment, but that there is 
no causation.  
Comparing the results from Table III to the results from the structural equation results 
in Table IV, many of the other ownership variables now have the opposite sign and the 
magnitude is much larger. There is also some indication that the instrumental variables are 
weak since only the log of total assets is significant and the other two instrumental variables 
have large p-values in the ownership equation.  
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Present and Past Market-to-Book Value of Equity 
 
Since the present profitability of investment plays no role in the reduced form regression 
above, we try to model the market-to-book value of equity more carefully. First, we introduce 
interaction terms between cash flow and the different ownership groups to test for soft and 
hard budget constraints of the different ownership groups and, second, in contrast with the 
literature, we introduce present and past market-to-book value of equity in the regression in 
order to take into account that investment decisions may also be based on historical values of 
the profitability of investment. The regressions are given by  
,
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where, in addition to above, kitd  is the indicator related to ownership group k (with cut-off 
level at 50%)  and the interaction term between cash flow and ownership group indicator, in 
other words, the cash flow sensitivity of investment, 
k
it
it
it d
K
CF
, is a proxy for soft and hard 
budget constraints of ownership group k. 
 
In order to deal with the issue of contemporaneous and lagged values of the market-to-
book ratio, the potential multicollinearity and inconsistency of the estimators, we analyze this 
dynamic model to control for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables and employ 
the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments estimator (Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998)) and its improvement by Windmeijer (2005) where the 
regression is estimated simultaneously in levels and first differences. Standard statistical tests 
are used to test the suitability and validity of the instrumental variables without having to 
resort to analyzing a first stage regression.  
In this estimation we believe that the market-to-book value of equity and the variables 
related to cash flow may be potentially endogenous, that is, current and past errors may be 
correlated with current and future values of the market-to-book value and the variables 
related to cash flow. Generalized Methods of Moments instruments of the level and 
difference regression equation for the market-to-book value of equity and the interaction 
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terms cash flow with indicators of ownership groups are specified as the values of the twice-
lagged and earlier variables. Generalized Methods of Moments instruments for the 
predetermined variable Leverage are specified as the values of the once-lagged variable.  The 
usual instruments for the level and difference regression equation are the exogenous 
ownership variables and the lagged-once capital intensity, time dummies and a time trend.  In 
order to reduce the instrument number, we collapse the instruments as discussed in Roodman 
(2006, section 3.2 and 3.5). 
We test the suitability of the instruments using standard tests in the Generalized 
Methods of Moments framework, the Sargan (1958) test and Hansen (1982) J-test, including 
all subgroups of instruments. If the instrumental variables regression is over-identified, both 
tests allow us to verify whether the moment conditions are jointly valid. All difference-in-
Hansen tests for the null hypothesis that the instrument subsets are exogenous are 
insignificant, with the lowest p-value of 0.267 (0.218) in the percentage (indicator) ownership 
model. We also check the suitability of the instruments using the Arellano-Bond (1991) test 
for the autoregressive model of order 1 and the autoregressive model of order 2 in first 
differences which looks for autocorrelation  in the errors. Both tests do not lead us to question 
the validity of the instruments and the employed lags in the instruments. We present the 
results of the Generalized Methods of Moments estimation of the investment model in Table 
V. 
 
Table V: Investment Rates and Ownership: Generalized Methods of Moments Estimation 
Investment Percentage Indicator 
Market-to-book 
value 
  
-present 
-.0019 
(.0043) 
-.00051  
(.0038) 
-1 lag 
.0031
*** 
(.0007) 
.0031
*** 
(.0006) 
State*CF 
-.0078 
(.1159) 
-.0541  
(.1437) 
Insider*CF 
.0796 
(.2488) 
.0503  
(.1963) 
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Non-domestic*CF 
.9836
*** 
(.0175) 
.9861
*** 
(.0149) 
Finance*CF 
1.3833
**
 
(.5591) 
1.3450
** 
(.5142) 
FIG*CF 
-.9665
* 
(.5775) 
-.9230
* 
(.5214) 
Leverage 
-.0119  
(.0143) 
-.0157  
(.0145) 
Log Total Assets 
-.0004 
(.0170) 
.0098  
(.0158) 
State 
-.1192
* 
(.0682) 
-.0817
* 
(.0477) 
Insider 
.0011  
(.0924) 
.0004 
(.0618) 
Non-domestic 
-.2294
*** 
(.0525) 
-.2352
*** 
(.0497) 
Finance 
-.2964
** 
(.1361) 
-.2513
** 
(.1203) 
FIG 
.1975  
(.1489) 
.1772  
(.1169) 
Significant Minority 
.0253  
(.0689) 
.0545  
(.0654) 
Constant 
.2274
 
(.2022) 
.0914
 
(.1886) 
F-Test 
(p-value)
 
268.72 
(.0000) 
326.80  
(.0000) 
Number Instruments 40 39 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
26.49  
(0.231) 
26.80 
(0.177) 
Hansen J 
(p-value) 
20.85  
(0.530) 
20.03  
(0.519) 
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The estimate for the present market-to-book value of equity is still insignificant, 
however, the past value is highly significant and positive providing support for the more 
general model.  
We discuss the impact of the ownership categories on firms’ investment in turn, both 
for the indicator and percentage model. The indicator specification can be interpreted as the 
impact of the presence of a majority ownership of the respective ownership group on 
investment rates, whereas the percentage specification can be interpreted as the impact of an 
increase in ownership shares of the respective ownership group on firms’ investment rates.  
For each ownership group we discuss the impact of the particular ownership type on firms’ 
investment rates and also on the interaction of cash flow and the indicator of the particular 
ownership type to provide evidence for soft and hard budget constraints of the ownership 
type.  
State ownership exerts a negative influence on firms’ investment. This is in contrast 
with the typical result regarding Eastern European economies (see, for example, Lizal and 
Svejnar (2002) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)). The cash flow sensitivity with respect to 
state ownership (State*CF) is not significant which indicates that state-owned companies 
face soft budget constraints. State ownership has a significantly negative impact on firms’ 
investment rates. The two results together are consistent with the presence of free cash flow 
(Jensen (1986)), and private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart (1988)). Even though 
there is evidence for free cash flow, the negative relationship of state ownership and 
investment, and the fact that on average companies with state ownership have  market-to-
book values of less than unity indicates that there is evidence for under-investment. 
Insider ownership does not significantly impact firms’ investment rates. The variable 
Insider*CF is positive, but insignificant indicating that insider owned firms do not face hard 
but soft budget constraints and appear to be subject to free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and 
private benefits. These two results seem to indicate that that there is over-investment for 
insider ownership. 
Firms with ownership by non-domestic entities and by banks and financial firms 
experience a negative impact on firms’ investment rates and hard budget constraints. These 
findings are consistent with the cash constraint hypothesis and can be interpreted as evidence 
for under-investment.  
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Ownership by financial and industrial groups (FIG) faces free cash flow and soft 
budget constraints, but the investment rates are not significantly impacted. This provides 
some evidence for over-investment. The corporate governance variable related to a blocking 
minority does not impact on firms’ investment rates significantly. 
As robustness checks, we entertain the possibility that also the ownership variables are 
endogenous. Treating all the percentage [dummy] ownership variables as endogenous and 
instrumenting them by lags two and higher, we find that the instrument count increases to 55 
[54] and the Sargan test (p-value of 0.012) [0.011] rejects the null hypothesis that the over-
identification restrictions are valid. In addition, all percentage ownership variables are now 
insignificant except the non-domestic ownership percentage with an estimate of -.2427 [-
.2647] (p-value 0.0000).  
Treating the percentage [dummy] ownership variables as endogenous one at a time, we 
find similar results to the ones reported Table IV above. The only exception in the percentage 
formulation is the case where state ownership is treated as potentially endogenous. In this 
case, the percentage state ownership variable becomes insignificant with the Sargan test (p-
value 0.082) as well as the Hansen test for this instrument subset (p-value 0.054) indicating 
potential issues with the appropriateness of the instruments. In the dummy variables 
specification entertaining the possibility endogenous state ownership the results are similar to 
Table IV except that the estimate for Tobin’s Q becomes insignificant 
4. Conclusions 
 
Using data from large Ukrainian firms for the period 2002-2007, we studied companies’ 
investment rates as a function of ownership and corporate governance variables. We focus on 
a specification using the presence and increases of a particular ownership type. The empirical 
analysis shows that the past market-to-book value of equity explains investment rates 
implying that investment decisions are taken based also on historical values of the 
profitability of investment. 
The paper provides the following results on the impact of ownership on investment. 
State ownership appears to be related to soft budget constraints and free cash flow (Jensen 
(1986)) and appears to be negatively related to investment due to private benefits of control, 
tunnelling. State owned firms are also likely to suffer from under-investment. 
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Ownership by insiders is related to free cash flow and soft budget constraints and it is 
likely that they suffer from over-investment. 
Ownership by non-domestic or finance firms appears to be related to hard budget 
constraints consistent with the cash constraint hypothesis.  The negative impact of these 
ownership categories on investment rates can be interpreted as evidence for under-
investment.  
Ownership by financial and industrial groups (FIG) appears to be related to soft budget 
constraints consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986). The insignificant 
relationship of this ownership category with investment rates indicates that such firms are 
likely to over-invest. 
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